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Abstract
This paper proposes to appeal to the structural-attributive approach 
to help establish a useful ontological categorization of information. 
Specifically, it argues that a framework for library and information sci-
ence (LIS) based on Stonier’s theory of information would be help-
ful, with the intention to advance one of the unfinished dialogues 
of LIS, the so-called Wiener’s problem, or statutum ontologicum. This 
proposal advocates the possibility of developing a theory based on 
the assumption that information is a basic property of the universe. 
Stonier’s perspective is an evolutionary type, so the basis of this re-
search is interdisciplinary, such that his ideas can help describe the 
development of society in the information age. It also explains the 
two main categories or forms of information, which Stonier called 
“applied,” for the library scope. In other words, there are the informa-
tion contained in a system and the transformed and processed information. 
He argues that information is an ontological category that exists 
independently of being perceived. This paper asserts that informa-
tion characterizes the world in itself, since it is through it that all 
knowledge is obtained.
Introduction
In the epic poem Metamorphoses, Ovid narrates: “Before there was the sea 
and the earth and the sky which covers everything, / Nature appeared the 
same throughout the whole world.” This extract is an appropriate epigraph 
for the trilogy of Tom Stonier. While it is true that nature reveals a face 
from so-called chaos, the meaning for this chaos (this “confused and unor-
dered mass of things”) is not similar to entropy (a function of disorganiza-
tion or disorder, a loss of organization or a loss of structural information). 
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The original Greco-Roman definition of chaos established it as the 
origin of the world of time, space, energy, and, of course, information 
—that is, the Gaia. In this sense, entropy is simply the measure of a change 
in organization, not necessarily an opposite concept.
For Charles Sanders Pierce (2012), this chaos is a dynamic and complex 
system, an amalgam that joins the characteristics of mind, matter, force, 
and life. Also, chaos had an additional attribute: to give form. The Latin 
concept informatĭo (giving form) was related to the ancient Greek con-
cepts eidos and morphé, which literally mean “form, figure, image.” These 
were used in different ways, the first in a philosophical sense (shaping 
the thought, conform, configure), the second in a technical and material 
sense (as Vulcan forging the iron). Transitive verb “formo, -āre” expresses 
“giving form, conform, construct, organize, shape.” On the basis of the 
etymological root inform-, it is possible to clarify the idea of instilling a 
“form” on the receiver of the action; the form is an organization, the con-
figuration of a structure (content). In the classical concept, the two na-
tures coexist: material origin and mental representation (Von Weizsäcker, 
1962, pp. 47–62).
Wiener’s problem is expressed many times through the pattern of an 
overriding physical representation (Floridi, 2004b, p. 572). Although 
Stonier analyzed authors like Ralph Hartley and Ludwig Boltzmann (in-
fluences on the later work of Shannon), his opus cannot be pigeonholed 
only in the category of physicalism. The “professor of futurology” said 
that information is a physical property of the universe, and actually that 
is, in part, a claim that establishes that information is as real as matter and 
energy. For example, according to Stonier (1992) and Devlin (1992), the 
basic units of information are the infons, but those “would not show up 
in any traditional physics experiment since such particles would possess 
neither mass nor energy—they would, however, manifest their effect by 
changes in organization” (Stonier, qtd. in Furner, 2014, p. 164; Stonier, 
1992, pp. 10–11). The structural-attributive approach does not believe re-
strictively in either material or immaterial reality because it recognizes 
both realities. Both Devlin and Stonier think that we should not research 
the substance without seeing the form, the structure, the order, and the 
interrelations of the various parts.
Stonier’s vision may seem physicalist, but his position with respect to 
information (to disciplines like LIS) is of the noetic type. The physical 
implementation is just one of the “faces” of the information. Some disci-
plines expose primarily its “physical face” (as computer science), but this 
does not imply that it is the only face. According to Stonier, the physical 
representation of information is only a first approach to its study. His in-
tellectual position contributed to giving shape to a new conceptualiza-
tion of knowledge organization, and he also changed the traditional con-
cept of library service, seen as a service in situ. Stonier (1990) spoke of a 
576 library trends/winter 2015
service without limitations of physical space, a logical space determined by 
the organization of information flow (pp. 181–182; see also Floridi, 2011, 
pp. 166–168).
As an information theorist, Stonier (1990, p. 1) clarified that energy 
and matter involve only the surface structure of the universe, which is eas-
ily perceived by our senses and is only an interface with which we interact. 
There is information that is not easily perceived, but no less real. Infor-
mation is in another plane of existence as the internal structure of the uni-
verse, but it is as real as the surface structure; in fact, without the internal 
structure, it is impossible understand the surface structure. Both coexist, 
or rather “exist as a dynamic interaction”; both are two sides of the same 
coin (as an Aristotelian hylomorphism). The information “is generated 
in the reflective medium of the system in relation to both internal (struc-
tural) and external (environmental) processes” (Faucher, 2013, p. 27; see 
also Farina, Bogaertb, & Schipania, 2005). 
Of course, this internal structure appears as a metaphysical concep-
tualization. This category is nonverifiable (Floridi, 2011, p. 245). From a 
metaphysical standpoint, Dretske (2008) established that information is 
delivered directly or indirectly from the objects that contain it and with 
which we interact. Martins (2005) noted the “syndrome of physics envy”: 
that science is merely physics. Stonier’s metaphysical realism is actually an 
ontological realism: through science, we can get closer to that internal re-
ality (Fresco, 2013). It is very risky to say that information is an ideal entity 
that does not exists in our world or is impossible to discover. Perhaps this 
conceptualization serves to abandon first-level ontology; it is also risky to 
state that information is an underlying structure that forms and shapes 
the way we think about the world.
Stonier’s (1990) vision regarding information is of the realistic type, 
meaning that it exists independently of human intelligence and beyond 
the world of phenomena (the objects, insofar as they appear and are 
known). The realist position is not limited to studying the biological or 
physical information: “The book contains information whether it is read 
or not. The information is there even if it is not transferred to a human 
reader” (p. 21). He does not deny that the information in libraries should 
contribute to strengthening the cultural and intellectual life of the com-
munity and develop an intelligence infrastructure based on goal achieve-
ment (conceptualization knowledge organization). Regarding this, Sto- 
nier says that “information exists. It does not need to be perceived to exist. It 
does not need to be understood to exist. It requires no intelligence to inter-
pret it. It does not have to have meaning to exist. It exists. . . . Information 
is a quantity which may be altered from one form to another. Informa-
tion is a quantity which may be transferred from one system to another” 
(pp. 21, 26; emphasis in original). A general theory of information should 
represent the subtle character of the internal structure (while recogniz-
 structural-attributive approach/morán-reyes 577
ing the surface structure) and epitomize, in the words of Hegel (1978), a 
“secret revolution that is not visible for all” (p. 149).
On the Structural-Attributive Type of Information
Flückiger (1999) describes two categories of information theory: structural- 
attributive and functional-cybernetic. Hofkirchner (2011) says that informa-
tion is created “if there is a surplus of effects exceeding causes in a sys-
tem. Information occurs during the process in which the system exhibits 
changes in its structure, or in its state, or in its behavior” (p. 54). The 
first category, structural-attributive, is represented by MacKay and Stonier 
as a key structure for understanding human nature (Doucette, Bichler, 
Hofkirchner, & Raffl, 2007). MacKay (1969) held an epistemological po-
sition in which information is a kind of knowledge while a datum is po-
tentially significant because when “we have gained information, when we 
know something now that we did not know before; when ‘what we know’ 
has changed” (p. 10). Zins et al. (2007) state that “according to Stonier 
[1993, 1997], data is a series of disconnected facts and observations” con-
verted into information (unit of difference) “analyzing, cross-referring, 
selecting, sorting, summarizing, or in some way organizing the data” 
(p. 11). When these data are connected, Furner (2004) talks of “infor-
mation-as-action” and “information-as-process” and defines information 
as “sequences of events that involve humans either as agents (subjects) 
or as patients (objects) or both, and that may thus be treated as acts or 
actions” (p. 442). This information can be constituted into a coherent 
body of knowledge. Knowledge consists of an organized body of informa-
tion and forms the basis of the kinds of insights and judgments that we 
call “wisdom.” Furner also uses the category of “information-as-universal,” 
which includes conceptions of information that apply the term to certain 
attributes, or properties, of objects or events. Floridi (2004a) adds the fol-
lowing comparison:
The following analogy may be helpful, even if it is not really fair to the 
philosophical thesis at stake. Imagine looking at the whole universe 
from a chemical level of abstraction: you are 70% water and 30% some-
thing else. Now consider an informational level of abstraction. You are 
100% a cluster of data. More precisely, you (as any other entity) are a 
discrete, self-contained, encapsulated package containing (i) the ap-
propriate data structures, which constitute the nature of the entity in 
question: state of the object, its unique identity, and attributes and (ii) 
a collection of operations, functions, or procedures, which are activated 
by various interactions or stimuli, namely messages received from other 
objects or changes within itself, and correspondingly define how the 
object behaves or reacts to them. (p. 664)
Beginning with the Boltzmann constant and Schrödinger equation, 
Stonier (1988) studied the order/disorder phenomena, as inverses. He 
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argued that the content of the structural information of a system is a func-
tion of order because it is a measure of the quantity of two open and 
antagonist systems: structural information and organization are directly and 
linearly related. Although Stonier’s entropy corresponds to the thermody-
namic equilibrium, he subsequently extrapolated it to implications about 
the order of living organisms, both in the constitutive structure of the 
attributes of human intelligence and in the future life of the species. The 
speculations of Schrödinger and Stonier made it  possible to see informa-
tion from a completely different theoretical perspective. This new way of 
understanding information is similar to what Cassirer (1989) had indi-
cated at the time when Wiener worked out the principles of cybernetics: 
“Between the receptor system and the effector system, which are to be 
found in all animal species, we find in man a third link [intermediate 
link] which we may describe as the ‘symbolic system.’ This new acquisi-
tion transforms the whole of human life” (p. 47). In Stonier (1990), this 
“symbolic system” can be the letters of the Latin alphabet or the nucleo-
tides of a DNA fragment (pp. 61–65). Wiener (1985) wanted to refute the 
materialistic positions of thinkers like Shannon and Stonier and declared 
that “information is information, neither matter nor energy” (p. 165). 
However, any system that maintains organization contains information; 
the higher organization of a system, the larger its information content.
Burgin (2002) considers that the structural-attributive theory does not 
represent information as such, in itself, so he prefers to talk about “in-
formation carrier.” Stonier thought that human information may have 
a physical reality of its own, apart from its human origin, and that the 
message simply comprises a data pattern underlying on carrier. Burgin 
seeks to establish some axiological and ontological principles for a gen-
eral theory of information, saying that 
the principal achievement of the general theory of information is that 
it explains and determines what information is. The new approach 
changes drastically our understanding of information, this one of the 
most important phenomena of our world. It displays that what people 
call information is, as a rule, only a container of information but not 
information itself. This theory reveals fascinating relations between 
matter, knowledge, energy, and information. The general theory of 
information is built as a system of principles that represent intrinsic 
properties of information and information processes. The set of the 
main principles consists of two parts: basic ontological and basic axi-
ological principles. Basic ontological principles . . . reflect the most es-
sential properties of information as a natural, social, and technological 
phenomenon as well as regularities of information functioning. This 
provides a foundation for the development of the general theory of 
information. (p. 2)
Burgin (2003) argues that structural information can be divided into 
three main types: 
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•	 External : An external information measure reflects the extent of exog-
enous changes; for example, the extent of changes in the environment 
of a system. This information measure (similar in some ways to the 
functional-cybernetic approach) is referred to by some authors as the 
“value of information.”
•	 Intermediate : An intermediate information measure reflects the extent 
of changes caused in the links between a system and the environment 
of this system.
•	 Internal : An internal information measure reflects the extent of endog-
enous changes caused by a system; for example, the change of the length 
(the extent) of a thesaurus (p. 149).
Stonier (1989) says that “what mass is to matter, or momentum to me-
chanical energy, organization is to information” (p. 43). Entropy is the 
measurement of a change in organization and not information’s adver-
sary (Faucher, 2013, pp. 27, 34).
Information and Meaning
On this topic, Stonier’s (1990) main thesis says that “‘information’ is 
not merely a product of the human mind—a mental construct to help 
us understand the world we inhabit—, rather information is a property 
of the universe, as real as are matter and energy” (p. 107). Information 
and meaning are not the same: “The information conveyed by a book is 
a function of the intellectual information environment present as knowl-
edge structures already existing inside the reader’s brain” (p. 22). Namely, 
our mental perception does not determine that something contains less 
or more information: the information is there. The fact that we cannot 
comprehend a text in another language does not mean that there is no 
information but rather that our minds cannot interpret it; although the 
“reader” does not fully understand the message, anyone can recognize the 
letters, and the book still makes sense on two levels: the book as an object, 
and the letters as signs. The reader does not understand the message but 
knows that the letters represent a message; for example, that lyrics belong 
and structure a code. Further, recall the anecdote of the Pioneer 10 space 
probe and its “interstellar message in a bottle.” The satellite carried an 
aluminum plaque anodized in gold that showed some diagrams: a hydro-
gen atom; an schema of the relative sizes of the planets in our solar system 
(noting the place where the satellite was launched); figures of two hu-
man bodies, male and female, the male’s hand raised in greeting. NASA’s 
intention was that, the satellite traveling beyond the confines of the so-
lar system and arriving at a place with intelligent life (perhaps millions 
of years from now), an alien race might encounter the ship and know 
something about life on planet Earth. The curious aspect of this story is 
the unlikelihood that these extraterrestrial beings could fully understand 
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the message. How could they know that the hand signal was a greeting 
and not a threat? Maybe the message could be assumed by patterns of 
organization. The fact is that the information was there independently of 
patterns, as “latent information” (so to speak), regardless of any possible 
intelligence to interpret it. As Stonier (1990) says, “Information exists. 
It does not need to be perceived to exist. It does not need to be under-
stood to exist. It requires no intelligence to interpret it. It does not have 
to have meaning to exist. It exists” (p. 21). “Meaning is achieved when the 
perceived information can be put into a context; information becomes 
meaningful only if it can be analyzed, compared and integrated with oth-
er information which already exists within the perceptor system” (1991, 
p. 261). 
From the above examples, three mutually exclusive positions can be 
identified, restructured as Stonier’s (1990) trilemma: 
•	 The	information	carriers	(aluminum	plaque,	the	book,	the	roll)	contain	
no information if it makes no sense to anybody.
•	 The	 carriers	 contain	 a	 sort	 of	 information,	which	however	does	not	
constitute real information until somebody can comprehend it.
•	 The	physical	structure	of	information	carriers	contains	information	(sur-
face structure) even though its message (subtle structure/internal structure) 
conveys no information (pp. 23–24; emphasis added).
Consider also the positions of Floridi (2005) related to false information, 
which enhances the vicissitude of “information as internal structure”: 
•	 False	information	could	have	been	genuine	information	had	the	relevant	
situation been different (counterfactual).
•	 False	information	can	include	genuine	information.
•	 False	information	can	entail	genuine	information.
•	 False	information	can	still	be	genuinely	informative,	if	only	indirectly.
•	 False	information	can	support	decision-making	processes.
•	 False	information	is	meaningful	and	has	the	same	logical	structure	as	
genuine information (pp. 361–362).
Floridi indicates that the information cannot be dataless, and also explains 
which types of data constitute information: primary data, metadata, op-
erational data, or derivative data (p. 354). But to differentiate between 
information and meaning (sense/significance spectrum), raises the ques-
tion: What kind of data do we need to have an idea of the horizon of 
interpretation? (Priani, Flores, Galina, Gómez, & Ocampo, 2013, p. 250). 
From another point of view, Capurro, Fleissner, and Hofkirchner’s 
(1997) trilemma (a trilemma of information) is a conditional for a uni-
fied theory of information (not as dogma). They propose a “dialecti-
cal informatism” that strives to return to the etymological definition of 
informatĭo or informa-tio, which means “concept, configuration, conforma-
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tion,” and the suffix “-tion,” which indicates a final action. This trilemma 
exposes three ontological perspectives of the world, with their respective 
disadvantages:
•	 Univocity: The concept of information means the same in all areas. Dis-
advantage: reductionism. 
•	 Analogy: The concept of information has its original meaning in a field 
(for example, human communication), and it only applies analogously 
to other levels. Disadvantage: anthropomorphism.
•	 Equivocity: The concept of information has different meanings in dif-
ferent fields. Disadvantage: Babel syndrome, speeches, and scientific 
theories are mutually encapsulated (pp. 213–215; see also Fleissner & 
Hofkirchner, 1995).
Univocity implies a single discipline, namely, a single object of study, inten-
tions, and procedures; analogy involves an interdisciplinary regime; and 
equivocity promotes multidisciplines by which the object of study would be 
shared intent and procedures but would differ. Saračević (1999) possibly 
would opt for the analogy because he argues that 
“information” has a variety of connotations in different fields. For in-
stance, from the standpoint of physics and biology, a number of highly 
ambitious (and as yet unsuccessful) attempts have undertaken to ex-
plore information as a basic property of the universe. . . . In psychology, 
information is used, at times, as a variable dealing with sensory percep-
tion, comprehension, or other psychological processes. These senses 
of information are very different than the one in information science. 
In some fields, information science included, the notion of informa-
tion is broadly associated with messages. For this sense, a number of 
interpretations exist, which are assumed in different theoretical and 
pragmatic treatments of information. We can present them as related, 
but differing manifestations of information in an ordered sequence or 
a continuum of increasing complexity. (p. 1054)
Saračević proposes some categories that oscillate between a lato sensu and 
a strictu sensu (similar to the notation of the thesaurus):
•	 Narrow	sense : Information is considered in terms of signals or messages for 
decisions involving little or no cognitive processing, or such processing 
that can be expressed in algorithms and probabilities. Information is 
treated as the property of a message, which can be estimated by some 
probability.
•	 Broader	sense : Information is treated as directly involving cognitive pro-
cessing and understanding. It results from interaction of two cognitive 
structures, a “mind” and, broadly, a “text.” Information is that which 
affects or changes the state of a mind. In cases of information services, 
information is most often conveyed through the medium of a text, doc-
ument, or record.
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•	 Broadest	sense: Information is treated in a context; that is, information 
involves not only messages (first sense) that are cognitively processed 
(second sense) but also a context—a situation, task, problem at hand, 
and the like. Using information that has been cognitively processed for 
a given task is an example (p. 1054).
 The language of a discipline occupies an important place because it is 
the tool with which concepts are designated. The concepts are the mean-
ings of various logical and grammatical forms and statements of speech. 
Therefore, we should aspire to own adequate and accurate terminology. 
We can say that the correct formation, introduction, and standardization 
of terms contribute to further development of a particular field of knowl-
edge. We should avoid	equivocity (tautologism and relativism) so that we 
do not fall into confusion, vagueness, ambiguity, and a lack of meaning; it 
also means the danger of creating confusion if the criteria for cataloging 
and classifying are not unified. 
Stonier (1992, 1997) distinguishes between information and meaning 
(as does Bateson, 2000); the spectrum that divides them is determined 
by a magnitude of variation or significance—namely, between tangible 
information and mental interpretations. Just as Stonier notes the dissimilar-
ity between information and meaning, Floridi (2002b, p. 137; 2004b, 
p. 563) does the same with the concepts information	flow and knowledge, 
saying that the first “operates at a much more basic level than the acquisi-
tion and transmission of knowledge” (2008, p. 127). For him, information 
is an elusive notion though at the same time a powerful conception. Al-
though it is less definitive than knowledge, so that it is a “lock-pick” con-
cept (2007, p. 48) inasmuch as it can be associated with several explana-
tions, one can dispose of it for privileged access to other concepts (2002b, 
p. 137). “Information is acquired, for example, without one’s necessarily 
having a grasp of the proposition which embodies it” (Dummett, 1993, 
p. 186; cited in Floridi, 2002b, p. 141). In addition to the above, present 
in the Floridian discourse are the rules of engagement between informa-
tion and reality (2012, p. 215).
Library and Information Science (LIS)
The relation between LIS and the concept of information is interlaced by 
notion of organization. Regarding this, Stonier (1990) develops the follow-
ing theorems:
•	 All	organized	structures	contain	information;	as	a	corollary,	no	organized	
structure can exist without containing some form of information.
•	 The	addition	of	 information	to	a	system	manifests	 itself	by	causing	a	
system to become more organized, or reorganized.
•	 An	organized	system	has	the	capacity	to	release	or	convey	information	
(pp. 25–26).
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 The organization of information and the structural-attributive perspec-
tive not only refer to the physical structure of biological information or en-
ergy, but the organization of information is also found in applied issues 
(the applied part of the general theory of information). This organization 
is the order of subtle/internal structure. According to Bates (1999),
In applied information science, we find ourselves primarily concerned 
with the form and organization of information, its underlying structure, 
and only secondarily with its content. In the sciences and humanities, 
it is the content that is of dominating concern. In fact, the organiza-
tion of the information they are using is usually virtually or entirely 
invisible to the practitioners of those disciplines; they have simply 
never thought of it, never realized that extensive and intellectually 
demanding work is needed to develop index and database standards, 
to select and catalog resources, etc. . . . The average person, whether 
Ph.D. scholar or high school graduate, never notices the structure 
that organizes their information, because they are so caught up in 
absorbing and relating to the content. And, in fairness to them, they 
are not interested in the structure. We are interested in the structure. 
As a practical matter, when one does the work to gather, store, orga-
nize, retrieve, and disseminate information—the classic elements of 
the formal, above-the-water-line paradigm definition of information 
science—one necessarily gets involved with understanding and manipu-
lating its form, structure, and organization. One’s attention is drawn, 
again and again, to these features of the information, simply to get the  
job done. (pp. 1044–1045)
In the above extract, information is an abstract force that promotes organiza-
tion in systems of all kinds: physical, biological, mental, and social, including 
records in libraries and documentation centers. Bates (2005) presents two 
definitions of information: the pattern of organization of matter and energy; 
and some pattern of organization of matter and energy given. She also 
finds a difference between information and meaning, expressed in the idea 
that in the cognitive process, information gives meaning, not is meaning; 
that is, information has “no inherent meaning.” Information contributes 
to the forming of insights, judgments, and social attitudes (Stonier, 1983, 
pp. 124–125). For Stonier, knowledge is composed of structured things, 
the so-called information structures.
Information Flows and Space
In the third-phase transition of LIS, electronic media wrought substan-
tive structural modifications in libraries, exemplified by the slogan “ser-
vice more than a place.” New technology did not replace libraries but 
increased their dependence on networks (Baker, 2003; Neustadt, 1981; Ni-
tecki, 1993). The library and its components were redefined; collections 
changed their size and how they were disseminated, and how information 
was transmitted. The nature of the object of study was re-ontologized.
For Stonier, the traditional concept of library service is not encapsulated 
by the physical space; rather, it is determined by the wide spectrum of 
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“information flows” (material or immaterial, organized or chaotic) and by 
logic (dynamic, epistemic, modal, local) through an order or organization 
in a system. For Bates, in contrast, information is the order in the system. 
Consistent with Barwise and Seligman (1997), Floridi (2004b) said that the 
information flow is understood as “the carriage and transmission of infor-
mation by some data about a referent, made possible by regularities in a 
distributed system” (p. 562). For Stonier (1997), the word regularities refers 
“to the purely structural properties that any such theory must satisfy. Any 
theory with these properties can be obtained from a suitable classification” 
(p. 117). For him, a book is able to convey a lot of information because 
the information has meaning for us. The reason that the information has 
meaning for us is that we are able to place the information conveyed into 
a personal context. A book not only contains much information, it also con-
veys much information. For example, Stonier, Ottley, Silverstone, and Steele 
(1990) describe what an electronic library would (or should) be: 
The library will hold material in digitized form and its users will com-
municate with it over a telephone link or a coaxial or a fibre-optic cable. 
Its purpose is to supply its users with copies of textual, audio or video 
materials on request. Because supply is effected by sending a digitized 
signal down the communication link, and the original does not leave 
the possession of the library, supply is not strictly a loan any more than 
the issue of a photo copy of a request article. (p. 176) 
Can seeing an informative coexistence between the physical structure and 
other structures be more “subtle”? 
Of course, our image of a library is based on the surface structure (physi-
cal world); even the virtual library is based in the physical world. None-
theless, digital information is not as easily noticeable as is a conventional 
book; digital information is much more subtle, since we cannot interact 
with this information (kinetic information) without an interface, but only 
with superficial information of the material disc or the polyethylene of a 
USB drive (structural information), not with its internal structure. As Lyre 
(1996) writes, 
For this purpose one has to be aware of the difference between syntactic 
and semantic information. I call syntactic information an amount of struc-
tural distinguishability which can be measured in bits. Beyond this the 
semantic aspect of information takes care of the fact that information 
only exists under a certain concept or on a certain semantic level. For 
example, a letter printed on a paper refers to different amounts of 
information if it is regarded under the concept “letter of an alphabet 
of a certain language” or under the concept “molecules of printer’s 
ink.” (p. 2224; emphasis in original) 
Dretske (2000) argues that we can interact with certain objects much 
more easily than others. Just remember the example of a bacterium and a 
cow: the bacterial agent requires a microscope (interface).
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Forms of Information
Stonier (1991) distinguishes between structural and kinetic information. 
Structural information is contained by a system; kinetic information is 
transmitted, processed, or transformed. The following example concerns 
not the book but the library. We can establish that the structural informa-
tion is the building, consulting rooms, the organization (involving the divi-
sion of departments, as well as the shelving, which is but an objectification 
of cataloging rules), architecture, and so on—namely, space, place. Kinetic 
information is latent information contained in and the foundation of all 
organized documents; it is transmitted through services and determined 
by some logics (dynamic, epistemic, modal, local) (pp. 259–260).
In the case of the evolution of the printed book to an electronic one, 
we can see a structural change, but kinetic information remains. Further-
more, this latter form implies new forms of information flows and even 
new services. As Slavkovský (2013) establishes:
While the relation between information and alignment or inner or-
ganisation of a system is obvious, postulating information as another 
physical constant is a more challenging intellectual endeavour. For 
example, if we take matter organisation, a book is a material contain-
ing aligned areas, with each area carrying a certain set of colours and 
forms we recognise as specific characteristics by a human eye. Modern 
electronic e-book readers enable identical ways of text reading, while 
using only one allows visualizing the information saved in a much more 
economical way—in a form of tiny areas using electromagnetic qualities 
of the materials. (p. 55) 
A system can only interact with its relevant environment according to the 
dynamics of its own structural organization.
Rocchi (2013, pp. 3–4, 45–47) recapitulates the different forms of in-
formational theories: statistical, semantic, algorithmic, descriptive, prag-
matic, autopoietic, hierarchical, dynamic, physical, and others. According to 
Rocchi, Stonier’s approach (the “organizational”) is seen as the product of 
the interaction between material signs and human interpretations; he took 
the same approach, proposing a framework for a unified understanding of 
information in various domains.
Swedish librarian Taeda Tomic (2010) shares the following reflection:
Information science is not a discipline with clear boundaries that would 
in a unified way describe its research questions, theories and methods. 
It is rather a complex, dynamic field that addresses many different re-
search problems grounded in a variety of theories and methodologies. 
This results in a plurality of theoretical and methodological sub-domains of 
information science. . . . What is the relation between the knowledge bases 
of these sub-domains? Does information science necessarily develop 
through the plurality of theories and methodologies each of which 
analyses some particular dimension of information? Are these differ-
ent approaches related to each other; and if so, in which way? Is it 
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meaningful to see the diverse theoretical and methodological frames 
as sub-domains of a unified theory of information science? Is there 
any need for such a unifying theory of information science? (n.p., 
emphasis in original)
Herold (2001), meanwhile, says that “these endeavors to unify informa-
tion theories are themselves beset by the staggering diversity of research, 
such as within the Foundations of Information Science movement.” The 
general theory of information of Stonier promotes organization in sys-
tems of all kinds: physical, biological, mental, and social, including re-
corded information (Rocchi, 2013, pp. 132–133). Data, which for Stonier 
is a series of disconnected facts and observations, is understood by Floridi 
as simply a lack of uniformity—a noticeable difference or distinction in 
something in line with Bateson’s (2000) “a difference which makes a dif-
ference” (p. 272). According to Robinson and Bawden (2014), for Floridi, 
“to count as information, individual data elements must be compiled into 
a collection which must be well-formed (put together correctly according 
to relevant syntax), meaningful (complying with relevant semantics), and 
truthful; the latter requires a detailed analysis of the nature of true in-
formation, as distinct from misinformation, pseudoinformation and false 
information” (p. 133).
In her inquiry, Tomic (2010) points out that the nature of a unifying 
theory for LIS must be metatheoretical, which “would study the ways in 
which the varying sub-domains deal with the phenomenon of informa-
tion. A unifying metatheory would also analyse the possibilities of relating 
the different sub-domains, and their results, to each other” (n.p.). Consis-
tent with Floridi (2002a, pp. 42–43), who uses a metatheoretical analysis 
for determining the degree of relevance of some semantic information, 
the metatheoretical perspective will allow us to distinguish the identity 
of LIS as a system of knowledge and to differentiate it from other areas 
of knowledge. No longer is it an amorphous situation in which the LIS 
has some indeterminate boundaries and crosses over into the territory of 
other disciplines or vice versa. Librarians have full awareness of its impor-
tance, at the same time as they try to build a link between innovation and 
tradition. According to Tomic, it seems that this unifying metatheory is 
the philosophy of information.
Present in both Mikhail Bakhtin and Peter Burke is a condition that is 
“polyphony.” At its foundation, LIS has multiple voices in its diversity of 
research and proposals, and I believe that the philosophy of information 
is not simply one more voice that adds to the concert of voices but rather 
an overriding voice that comes to orchestrate all the other voices. Thus, a 
general theory of information should be a polyphonic theory. A starting 
point would be the Nitecki’s (1993) model, which 
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accounts for the logical objectivity of the process describing the reality, 
and its subjective interpretation by individual patrons, by incorporating 
seemingly unrelated individual experiences into a totality of cumula-
tive society’s as well as the individual’s understanding of reality. This 
approach should satisfy the pragmatic goals of practicing librarians and 
the theoretical objectives of information scientists, since it recognizes 
the existence of different goals and habits in both practical and abstract 
thinking and suggests a common denominator for both the empirical 
and metaphysical interpretation of reality. (p. 368)
This model represents the physical, philosophical, and cultural reali-
ties in librarianship, and also an unknown reality. Physical reality represents 
procedural aspects and records; philosophical reality symbolizes conceptual 
aspects, as a continuum: data – information – knowledge (the so-called 
α, β, γ relation); and cultural reality depicts contextual aspects as human 
interpretations (p. 368; Floridi, 2002a, pp. 38–43). The unknown	 reality, 
according to Twining (1999), is 
the place to which Nitecki has led us and where he has firmly planted 
the cornerstone of librarianship’s future. It is the space without a literal 
guide; the space beyond the textual processing capability of the human 
mind; the space beyond the “five plus or minus two” object capacity of 
the human short-term memory. It is the space for which technology 
has failed to come up with the diagrammatic reasoning tool we might 
use to guide us to our future. (n.p.)
This reality would be the infosphere environment, and the human process-
ing would correspond to the inforg.
In fact, the philosophy of information is congruent with library tradi-
tion. From Bliss and Danton’s discussions on the 1930s, through Egan 
(without Shera), Nitecki, and Floridi, there stands a very definite genea-
logical line (Morán Reyes, 2013, pp. 85–86). This evolution shows that 
the question is not whether to replace knowledge for something else but 
to deepen, complement, and develop the knowledge you have, and then, 
only if necessary, change some schemes.
Conclusion
The structural-attributive approach is a discourse that contributes to the 
foundations to LIS; the recognition that LIS is a complex discipline; and 
the establishment of a general theory of information. The philosophy of 
information is the principal voice of study of the conceptual nature of in-
formation, and Stonier is an important precedent for other perspectives 
about information phenomena. The contrast between physicalism and ide-
alism is not easy to determine. Stonier’s position with respect to the infor-
mation study is of the noetic type, and he articulates both perspectives. 
Contemporary LIS requires a rich conceptualization of information to 
recognize its complexity and to advocate for research trends releasing the 
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library to modify its structure. Information becomes meaningful only if it 
can be compared and integrated with other information.
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